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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
POLYGLYCOAT CORPORATION,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vsSTEVEN HOLCOMB dba
STEVE HOLCOMB DISTRIBUTING,
Defendant-Appellant.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by the plaintiff to collect
on an account for goods sold; and a counterclaim by the defendantappellant for damages resulting from an alleged breach of a
distributorship contract.
DISPOSITION BELOW
The trial court prior to trial, granted plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment on its complaint which was unopposed
by the defendant-appellant.

Following a two and one-half day

trial on the defendant's counterclaim to a jury, the Hon. Bryant H.
Croft, one of the judges of the Third Judicial District Court of
Salt Lake county, granted a judgment of directed verdict in
favor of plaintiff-respondent on defendant-appellant's counterclaim for breach of a distributorship contract.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-respondent seeks affirmance of the trial
court's judgment of directed verdict.

It appearing that

defendant-appellant has abandoned his appeal of the Summary
Judgment granted in the same action, plaintiff-respondent also
seeks affirmance of that Surrunary Judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant-appellant (hereinafter "appellant") had
been delinquent in the payment of his account from the start
of the verbal contract of distributorship (R. 504 1 514, 516,
517).

Plaintiff-respondent (hereinafter "respondent"), Poly-

glycoat Corporation, was told at the time the distributorship
agreement (Exhibit D-3) was signed on February 7, 1976, that
appellant needed the contract so that he could obtain financing
or money to pay the bills and that was the only reason that
the distributorship agreement was signed (R. 531) .
Holcomb paid Polyglycoat only by the case of material
sent to him.

Each case contained twelve maintenance kits with

warranties and two quarts of the base product.

Each case was

intended to allow twelve new car purchasers to receive cars
with an application of Polyglycoat base and a maintenance kit
with warranty (R. 644).
Experience proved too much base product was supplied.
Holcomb sold that to dealers for $140 to $150 per quart (R. 642,
645).

He received the sole benefit of these sales (R. 647).
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As distributor for Polyglycoat, he knew he was supposed
to use his best efforts to represent the manufacturer (R. 646) .
Holcomb knew that if Walter Fiveson had known of
Holcomb's activities in selling excess sealant, printing bogus
warranties and ordering counterfeit bottles at the time of
signing the distributorship agreement, Exhibit D-3, he would
have been upset (R. 670).

When Holcomb first heard from Five-

son after Fiveson learned of the duplicity, Fiveson was so
angry he said he didn't care about the money, he only wanted
to see Holcomb "up the river"

(R. 670).

At the very time that appellant proposed the written
contract, he had already devised and undertaken a scheme to
sell fake products in the containers identical to those

~

Polyglycoat and had, in fact, ordered bottles with that t:o~
and had ordered counterfeit warranties with the language copied
from the Polyglycoat Corporation warranties (R. 669) .

One case

of counterfeit warranties and bottles were, in fact, delivered
to a customer, i.e., Duaine Brown, by appellant's agent and
employee, Brad Parkinson, about February 18, 1976 (Exhibit 41-P,
R. 591, 698, 699).

Although Holcomb denied authorizing the

delivery of the bogus products, he admitted picking the shipment
up from ouaine Brown (R. 698).

Appellant, by his own testimony,

acknowledged that as of February 1, 1976 (six days prior to the
time the distributor agreement was signed), he had purchased
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certain materials from Jenson Distributing Company, Salt Lake
City, consisting of cleaners and various waxes and bottles, to
experiment with those products to see if, when placed in the
counterfeit bottles, they would be compatible with the Polyglycoat sealant (R. 656).
The appellant also admitted on cross-examination that
at the time he was in Las Vegas in February of 1976, on the
occasion of signing Exhibit D-3, that he had already ordered
printed warranties counterfeiting those of the respondent, and
that he had already ordered sixteen ounce bottles with the
~-~

~

Polyglycoa~~go on them (R.

669) .

Appellant had no authority, implied or otherwise, to
either manufacture the bottles with the Polyglycoat label or to
print and reprint the warranty or to sell the excess sealant or
to market the product in any manner inconsistent with the regular
instructions and method of doing business of Polyglycoat Corporation.

The respondent specifically informed appellant that

the excess product was to be disposed of by giving the dealers
extra amounts so that they could do their used cars and
demonstrators.
(R. 526).

Such was viewed as being a good-will gesture

The distributors, including appellant, were to be

given a rebate or some other kind of remuneration for product
returned to respondent (R. 527) .
The scheme was called to the attention of Polyglycoat
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officials in Las Vegas in the latter part of March, 1976, when
Brad Parkinson, a former employee of appellant, became concerned
about possible criminal prosecution and recourse against him
(R. 707, 708, 714, 716, 717).
Appellant was then terminated as a distributor on
March 27, when respondent learned of the scheme to pass off
certain of appellant's product as those of Polyglycoat in counterfeit bottles and with false printed warranties (R. 537, 538,
740 and Exhibit 20-D).

The termination of the distributorship

agreement was both verbal and in writing (R. 740, Exhibit 20-D).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED
VERDICT WHERE THERE WAS A SUBSTANTIAL SHOWING
OF BAD FAITH AND NO MORE THAN A SCINTILLA OF
EVIDENCE OF GOOD FAITH
It is inconceivable that a careful reading of the
record will reveal more than the slightest evidence of good
faith on the part of the appellant.

The trial court was amply

justified in finding that reasonable men could not differ in
concluding that fraud and the lack of good faith and the
presence of substantial bad faith was established by clear-cut,
unequivocal evidence.

The scheme was admittedly motivated by

profit without the knowledge or consent of respondent and could
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not, under any stretch of the imagination, be said to be evidence
of good faith.

The undisputed facts indicate a clear intention

on the part of the appellant not to perform the contract in good
faith; but on the contrary, to pirate the trademark and warranties
of Polyglycoat.

In addition, the concealment by and failure of

Holcomb to disclose to respondent the details of the scheme or
of his intentions at the time Exhibit D-3 was signed, clearly
constitute a fraud.

The Restatement of the Law of Contracts,

Second, Section 473, states:

"A contractual promise made with

the undisclosed intention of not performing it is fraud."
It is also clear that fraud has been proved under
Section 471 of the Restatement which defines fraud:

'"Fraud'

as used in the Restatement of this Subject unless accompanied
by qualifying words means . .
disclosure . .

(b) concealment or (c) non-

Under the present circumstances, such

non-disclosure is fraud, without more.

See also the Restatement

of the Law of Contracts, Second, Section 472.

The distributor-

ship agreement could not have ripened into an enforceable
contract because of the active concealment of the appellant of
the fact that he had in bad faith unfairly engaged in competition and fraudulently made arrangements to counterfeit
respondent's bottles and warranties and to palm off his own
packages as Polyglycoat products.
Certainly, such non-disclosure could not be privileged
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under the Uniform Commercial Code.

Appellant was held to deal-

ing in good faith, meaning "honesty in fact" and that good
faith and honesty was imposed as an obligation in every facet
of the performance and promises under the contract.
as it is a part of the law of Utah, states:

The Code,

"Good faith means

honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned" (U .C.A.,
1953, 70A-l-201(19)).

The Code further provides that:

"Every

contract or duty within this act imposes an obligation of good
faith in its performance or enforcement" (U.C.A., 1953, 70-A-1203).

The case of Tumber v. Automation Design & Mfg. Corp.,

130 N.J. Super. 5, 324 A.2d 602 (1974) cited at page 6 of appellant's
brief, points out the increased standards of good faith required
by merchants under the Code.
A careful analysis of the cases cited by appellant in
his brief will reveal that they more fully support the trial
court's position and that of respondent than that of appellant.
None of the cases cited by appellant under Point I of his
argument are directly on point.

They involve cases where the

issue is whether the party is a "buyer in the ordinary course
of business" or "holder in due course."

The case of Walter E.

Heller & co., Inc. v. Convalescent Home, 49 Ill.App.3d 213,
265 N.E.2d 1285 (1977), is cited by appellant for the proposition
that good faith is particularly a jury issue and the defense
of the lack of good faith cannot be resolved purely as a matter
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of law.

However, the case involved a pleading question and the

dismissal of an amended answer at the pleading stage on the
grounds that it raised an insufficient defense as a matter of
law.

The court pointed out that the defense could not be

resolved as an issue of law "because of . .

. evidentiary matters

relevant to plaintiff's honesty in fact in this particular
transaction."

(265 N.E.2d at 1291)

The situation presented in

that case is clearly different than the situation here where,
after a full trial of the issues, the trial court directed a
verdict.

Appellant's attempt to persuade this court that a

directed verdict cannot be entered in such case is untenable.
The undisclosed sales by Holcomb of quart cans of
Polyglycoat sealant in competition with respondent, even before
the execution of the distributorship agreement, constitutes a
breach of the distributorship agreement under ?OA-2-306(2),
U.C.A., 1953, which provides:

* * *
"(2) A lawful agreement by either the seller or
the buyer for exclusive dealing in the kind of
goods concerned imposes, unless otherwise agreed,
an obligation by the seller to use best efforts
to supply the goods and by the buyer to use best
efforts to promote the sale."
In the instant case there is no substantial contradictor
evidence on any material point; and the trial court, in directing
the verdict, did view the evidence most favorably to appellant
in accordance with the Utah law.

The trial court's analysis of

the good faith issue clearly shows that it considered the
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8

reasonable persons could not arrive at any conclusion other
than there was an absolute lack of good faith on appellant's
part and overwhelming evidence of his bad faith as shown by the
uncontroverted evidence and by his own admissions.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING PLAINTIFFRESPONDENT' S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT WHERE
THERE WAS A FAILURE OF EVIDENCE OF DAMAGE
Certainly, the trial court would not be required to
submit the case to the jury on the issue of damages when there
was an absolute failure of proof of damages.

The appetlant's

own evidence fails to show a loss of profit of any kind.

The

most elementary rules of law provide that damages for breach of
contract must be proved with reasonable certainty.

Wilcox v.

Regester, 417 Pa. 417, 207 A.2d 817, 842 (1965), states the
rule as follows:
There can be no award for breach of contract
(except in certain cases an award of nominal
damages) when there is no evidence produced
by which the jury can measure the damages.
Damages cannot be awarded by guesswork.
The
Restatement of the Law of contracts, Sec.
331, lays down the following:
"Damages are
recoverable for losses caused or for profits
and other gains prevented by the breach only
to the extent that the evidence affords a
sufficient basis for estimating their amount
in money with reasonable certainty." In
Rice v. Hill, 315 Pa. 166, 172, 172 A. 289,
291, this Court held:
"Damages are never
presumed; the plaintiff must establish by
evidence such facts as will furnish a basis
for their assessment, according to some
definite and legal rule."
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POINT III
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING PLAINTIFF
TO AMEND ITS REPLY TO THE COUNTERCLAIM
The case of Wirtz v. Savannah Bank and Trust Co.,
362 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1966) cited at page 11 of appellant's
brief, is inapposite.

That case dealt, inter alia, with a motion·

to amend an answer pursuant to Rule 15(b) of Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.

This rule allows amendment of pleadings to

conform to the evidence adduced at trial "/w/hen issues not
raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent
of the parties . . . "

The court found that factually, the

question involved was not tried "by the express or implied
consent of the parties."

(362 F.2d at 861)

In the case at

bar, the amendment of the pleadings was prior to trial and hence
the cited case is not controlling.
Neither should appellant be allowed to claim that
fraud was not pled with specificity in light of the fact that
at the time the Motion to Amend Reply was argued to the trial
court, appellant did not argue that the Amended Reply did not
plead fraud with specificity, nor was the offer of a continuance
made by the respondent accepted by appellant.

Likewise,

appellant did not raise this issue in his motion for a new trial
(R. 155-156).

Respondent's Motion to Amend Reply with the

proposed Amended Reply attached was hand-delivered to counsel
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for appellant on January 30, 1978 (R. 72), and no mention of lack
of specificity is made in Defendant's Memorandum in Support of
its Claims in This Action, presented to the court on February 6,
1978 (R.

77-92).
Fraud was pled in appellant's Amended Reply.

The

sufficiency of the pleading was a question to be resolved in
the considered discretion of the trial court.

The cases cited

by appellant to support his view that the form of the Amended

Reply was improper are all trial court opinions.

On appeal,

the discretion of the trial court in granting or denying
amendments to pleadings should not be interfered with absent a
showing of abuse of that discretion.

(See, e.g., Lewis &

Queen v. S. Edmundson & Sons, 113 C.A.2d 705, 248 P.2d 973
(1952))

No such abuse of discretion can be shown here.
Since fraud was pled in the Amended Reply, the case of

Bunge Corp. v. Recker, 519 F.2d 449 (8th Cir. 1974) is not in
point.

Accepting that lack of faith is akin to fraud, the

pleading of fraud would, in the case at bar, reasonably cover
lack of good faith.
Appellant cannot reasonably be allowed to claim
surprise and prejudice because respondent was allowed to amend
its reply to the counterclaim to refer to the "underlying fraud
and concealment on the part of the Defendant at the time of the
execution of the contract."

This is particularly true in view
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of the fact that from the outset of this action on April 27,
1976, the respondent has continuously alleged that appellant
unlawfully infringed its trademarks and counterfeited Polyglycoat' s bottles and warranties without authorization and in
unfair competition.

From the outset of this action, appellant

has been apprised that respondent was claiming its acts to be
fraudulent and in fact obtained a restraining order and injunction based upon the appellant's acts constituting infringement
of the trademark and from using the fake bottles and warranties
(R. 621) .

It is 'O'lear that fraud and deception are the gist

of such action and the amendments allowed by the court did not,
in any way, surprise appellant or prejudice him in the defense
of the action.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court was
entirely within its judicial province when it granted plaintiffrespondent' s motion for directed verdict.

It is abundantly

clear from the record that there was an absolute lack of good
faith on the part of the defendant-appellant.

The jury should

not be allowed to speculate in cases where there is no morw
than a scintilla of evidence of good faith, and that from the
defendant-appellant's self-serving declarations.

It is submitt~

that the evidence is so conclusive on both the issue of good
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faith and on the issue of damages and there being no showing
I

of an abuse of the discretion of the trial court, that the
action of the trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

Attorneys for PlaintiffRespondent
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